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Kenya’s 2007 general election and its aftershocks
 
n December 2007 Kenya conducted the fourth elections since the return to
a multiparty system in December 1991. While the first two elections, in
1992 and 1997, had clearly fallen short of meeting the international standards
for democratic elections, the 2002 elections were rightly hailed as democratic,
setting a benchmark for elections throughout Africa. The 2002 elections were
also the first where the Kenyan people voted out the ruling party – the Kenya
African National Union (KANU), that had been in power since independence
in 1963. The 2002 experience boosted the Kenyans’ confidence and trust in
democracy as a political system. For the international community, it indic-
ated a consolidation of democracy in Kenya. These assumptions were proved
wrong by the 2007 elections and their aftermath.
I
The elections of December 27th, 2007, led to a largely unexpected politic-
al crisis and brought the country to the brink of civil war. The officially-de-
clared victory of the presidential election by the incumbent President Mwai
Kibaki was disputed by the opposition, civil society and domestic and inter-
national observers alike. In a rather surprising move the international com-
munity stood united, did not endorse the presidential election results and
put  strong  pressure  on  Kenya’s  political  leaders  to  solve  the  crisis.  The
power-sharing formula, brokered by former UN Secretary General Kofi An-
nan in late February 2008, would not have been possible without this united
stand by the international community.
Large-scale violence erupted after the official declaration of Kibaki’s vic-
tory on the evening of December 30th. Much of the unrest took the shape of
an ethnic conflict between communities that had voted overwhelmingly for
Odinga (the Luo, Kalenjin) and those that had voted for Kibaki (the Kikuyu,
Embu, Meru). Long-standing conflicts over land and social injustice fuelled
the violence.  According  to  different  estimates,  at  least  1,000,  but perhaps
more  than  1,500  people were  killed altogether,  mainly  in the  Rift  Valley,
Nyanza Province and Nairobi. At least 350,000 people (but probably a much
higher number) were evicted from their homes, mostly in the Rift Valley. The
immediate crisis only came to an end after former UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan succeeded in brokering a power-sharing deal  between Kibaki  and
Odinga on February 28th, 2008.
The precarious façade of political stability in Kenya 
The international community perceived Kenya – in contrast to its neighbours –
as politically rather stable, having been on the right track to democratic con-
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solidation since 2002. Kenya had had only three presidents (Jomo Kenyatta
1963-1978), Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002) and Mwai Kibaki since 2002. It had
conducted elections every five years, and changes of power occurred through
constitutionally sound successions. 
However, particularly after the successful elections in 2002 – the first
that saw a change of power through the ballot boxes – there was a tendency
to overlook the fact that Kenya had had its share of destabilising develop-
ments since independence,  and that  its political fabric  is characterised by
structurally fragile power relations. Politics in Kenya have been structured
largely along ethnic lines, while ideologies played only a minor role. With no
ethnic group in a majority position,1 ethno-regional alliances were formed in
order to build stable governments. The one-party state under Kenyatta and
Moi was used as a framework to ensure this stability. It provided a mix of in-
centives for co-operation as well as coercive and – particularly during Moi’s
reign in the 1980s – repressive measures. When the return to multiparty polit-
ics in 1991 opened up new political space, longstanding ethno-political cleav-
ages took centre stage, underlined by, so far suppressed, conflicts over land
access and ownership:  Ethnic  communities  that  felt  sidelined by  the  Moi
government joined the opposition (the Kikuyu, the Luo, parts of the Luhya,
parts of the Kamba) while the Moi regime tried to consolidate its ethno-re-
gional  power  basis  among  the  Kalenjin,  Maasai,  Samburu,  and  Turkana
(KAMATUSA) communities in the Rift Valley, with some support from the
coast and segments of other communities (the Luhya, Kamba, Kisii). After
the majority of Kikuyu leaders had left the KANU between 1988 and 1991,
the Moi regimeno longer felt obliged to safeguard the Kikuyu interests in the
Rift Valley. Kenyatta, as president and Kikuyu leader, and Moi, as the leader
of the Kalenjin, had struck a deal in the 1960s: The Kalenjin would redirect
their land interest in the Rift Valley further north, leaving big shares of land
around Nakuru and Laikipia for the Kikuyu; they would be compensated by
senior positions in and integration into the KANU coalition. However, a strong
discontent among the Kalenjin has simmered ever since.  When the Kikuyu
overwhelmingly joined the opposition, senior Kalenjin leaders, some of them in
the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) camp today, seized the moment and
instigated ‘ethnic cleansings’ in parts of the Rift Valley, targeting so called ‘non-
indigenous’ ethnic minorities (the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, and Kisii). Around the
first two multiparty elections in 1992 and 1997 more than 1,500 people were
killed and about 500,000 internally displaced, mainly in the Rift Valley, but also
around Mombasa. 
The  second cleavage  that  strongly  influenced the  elections  was  that
between the Kikuyu and Luo communities, determined by strong tensions
since the 1960s, when Oginga Odinga, father of the 2007 presidential candid-
ate Raila Odinga, was dismissed as vice president in 1966. Three years later,
the other Luo leader, KANU Secretary-General, Tom Mboya, was assassin-
1  The Kikuyu (18.3%, according to the 1999 census), the Luhya (14%), the Kalenjin (12%),
the Luo (10.7%), and the Kamba (10.2%) are the largest among Kenya’s 42 ethnic groups. 
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ated; Odinga’s Kenya People’s Party (KPU) was banned and its leader de-
tained.  Strong feelings of betrayal have never ceased, particularly because
the Luo areas of Nyanza Province have felt neglected ever since in terms of
investment and development. The conflict re-entered the national political
stage before and after the 2002 elections: Raila Odinga, together with a num-
ber of long-serving KANU ministers (among them Kalonzo Musyoka), left
the ruling party of outgoing President Moi and joined the opposition, then
led by Mwai Kibaki. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the
two leaders promised Odinga that he would become Prime Minister, once
this position had been created in a constitutional reform process. After his
election victory,  however,  Kibaki  did  not  honour  the  MoU.  The coalition
eventually split when the government presented its own constitutional draft
for a referendum, thereby widely disregarding the broad consensus that had
emerged through three constitutional conferencesfrom 2003-04. 
Kibaki and his government clearly lost the referendum against the new op-
position alliance of the ODM, led by Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka. Na-
tionally and internationally the government was complimented for accepting de-
feat. 
The election campaign 2007
In  2007,  the  allies  of  2002  contested  against  each  other,  while  Uhuru
Kenyatta, the runner-up of 2002, joined the Kibaki camp, thereby uniting the
Kikuyu  bloc.  In  2007,  Odinga  was  presidential  candidate  for  the  ODM,
Kibaki for the newly-founded Party of National Unity (PNU), and Kalonzo
Musyoka,  from  the  Ukambani  region  of  Eastern  Province,  stood  for  the
ODM-Kenya. While both the ODM and the PNU appeared as broad ethno-re-
gional coalitions,  the  ODM had a much stronger leadership team, as its re-
gional  representatives held  far  more  grassroots  popularity than  the  PNU
leaders from these regions. The PNU campaign was rather badly organised,
with several factions fighting each other  either for the best  positionin the
Kibaki succession in 2012 or for regional supremacy. By contrast, the ODM
campaign appeared well structured, with clear leadership roles assigned to
the so-called ‘Pentagon’, the main decision making body of the party that
symbolised the ethno-regional character of the coalition. Kibaki first led the
opinion polls, his claim for re-election based primarily on the solid growth of
Kenya’s economy under his presidency. By autumn, however, Odinga took
the lead, his appeal for ‘change’ directed at those who had been sidelined by
the boom. Opinion polls in December pointed to an extremely close race.
Regarding the post-election violence, the most significant issue of the
campaign was the debate about the system of governance. For the first time
since independence,  an election campaign presented the electorate with a
clear policy choice: between the current centralised form of government (the
PNU) and a devolved or  federal  system (the ODM).  This  difference  had
already dominated debates about the 2005 referendum. In 2007, however, the
debate took a populist turn that paved the way for the ethnic violence after
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the elections. Both sides spoke of ‘Majimbo’, a term with problematic histor-
ical connotations, in order to describe the ODM position on devolution. The
term ‘Majimbo’ had been used during the ethnic cleansings in the 1990s. Em-
ploying it in the 2007 campaigns, both sides played with the aspirations and
fears of Kenyans and thus fuelled the ethno-political tension around issues of
land and resource distribution. 
The  ODM could only win by making a case for  Majimbo.  With not
many votes to garner in Central and Eastern Provinces, the unpopularity of
the concept in those regions hardly affected the ODM’s overall election pro-
spects. In other places, however, Majimbo was highly popular: In the North
Eastern Province and especially along the Coast (where much of Kenya’s for-
eign currency income isgenerated by tourism, with little of its profit being re-
invested locally), Majimbo was popular because of the neglect experienced
under  all  governments  since  independence;  people  expected  Majimbo  to
provide a bigger  share of the national  cake,  i.e.  infrastructure,  health and
educational facilities. In the Rift Valle, Majimbo meant the option to reverse
the land distribution created after independence; many Kalenjin understood
it as an invitation to conclude the business left unfinished in the 1990s. 
The PNU reinforced such perceptions of the Majimbo issue as it spelt
out the possible consequences. PNU politicians warned that the Kikuyu and
other minorities would be expelled from the Rift Valley, should the ODM win
the elections. Much of the Kalenjin electorate could not agree more (with the
PNU) on this point. In the weeks before the elections, hate leaflets and text
messages circulated widely in the Rift  Valley. Political contestants  on both
sides accentuated and exploited the Majimbo theme and thereby even further
polarized a country already deeply divided along ethno-political lines.
The disputed election results
The elections on December 27th proceeded largely in an orderly and peaceful
manner. The voters’ turnout was visibly high, reaching about 70% according
to the ECK’s (Electoral Commission of Kenya’s) official figures. From the fol-
lowing day onwards, the Kenyan media began to publish results of individu-
al constituencies; some of these figures had been declared officially, while
others were  based merely  on  information gathered by  journalists  at  con-
stituency tallying centres throughout the country, and thus unconfirmed and
not entirely consistent. Still, two major trends appeared obvious: Odinga led
in the presidential polls, and more than a dozen political heavyweights in
President  Kibaki’s  cabinet  had lost  their  parliamentary seats.  Both  trends
seemed to confirm that a substantial majority of the electorate had voted for
the ‘change’ represented by the ODM. 
However, as more and more results from Kibaki strongholds in Central
Province  were  coming in on December 29th,  Odinga’s  majority began to
dwindle. Uneasiness about the delay in the announcement of results became
widespread; the first street protests (eg., in Nairobi and Mombasa), accompa-
nied by sporadic violence (in Western Kenya), already erupted on December
29th. Towards the evening of that day, confusion reigned at the ECK’s head-
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quarter in Nairobi, where officials and party agents tried to sort out disputed
results, debating the validity of returns from dozens of constituencies. 
Towards the evening of December 30th the ECK announced a narrow
victory for Kibaki, with 4.58 million votes as against 4.35 million for Odinga.
Musyoka (the ODM-Kenya) became third with 0.88 million votes. The results
were strongly regionalized, with Kibaki dominating in Central Kenya, Odin-
ga in the West and the Rift Valley, and Musyoka in the Ukambani region in
Eastern Province. One hour later Kibaki was sworn in, with only selected
media admitted to the ceremony at State House.  Two days later, with the
country up in flames, even ECK chairman Samuel Kivuito told journalists
that he was not any longer sure whohadactually won the elections.
While even most international observers regarded the presidential elec-
tion results as – at least – highly questionable, citing various examples from
constituencies where results had ‘obviously’ been manipulated, the ODM de-
cided it would not go to court over the results, declaring it had no confidence
in Kenya’s judicial system. Based perhaps on its own campaign propaganda
according to which the ODM could not fail to win except if the elections were
rigged, the ODM leadership was convinced to have gained a clear victory
which was simply ‘stolen’ later on. Much international reporting on Kenya in
the first few days of the crisis shared this conviction. However, a closer look
at the results reveals that the matter was much less straightforward:
  After Odinga’s  substantial lead in the partial results published during
the first day of vote-counting many critics assumed that results from the
PNU strongholds in Central Province were deliberately held back in or-
der  to  ‘tailor’  a  Kibaki victory. Though this cannot be ruled out, it  is
worth noting that in 2002 results from several constituencies in Central
Kenya  (Gatundu  South  &  North,  Juja,  Kieni,  Kipipiri,  Nyeri  Town,
Gatanga) had also come in last. This would point to the possibility that it
was simply organisational deficits, rather than a rigging ‘grand strategy’,
which contributed to the delays.
  Various attempts have been made to check the plausibility of results on
the level of individual constituencies. Without doubt, voters’ mobilisa-
tion was high in the 2007 elections; still, extraordinarily high turnout fig-
ures  in  specific  constituencies  (going  beyond  85%  in  some  Kibaki
strongholds, up to 86% in the Rift Valley or even beyond 95% in some
Odinga strongholds in Nyanza) must be suspicious. They point to infla-
tion of figures on both sides. Other analysts tried to identify major dis-
crepancies between the number of votes cast in the presidential and par-
liamentary elections,  respectively, assuming that  such differences may
point to cases of ‘vote doctoring’.  However,  even the  results  of these
plausibility checks remained inconclusive as to the question of who ‘real-
ly’ won the elections. They merely suggest that rigging took place on a
considerable scale, and that the number of votes of doubtful validity ex-
ceeds the number of votes by which Kibaki’s victory was secured. 
  The parliamentary election results – much less controversial than the out-
come of the presidential contest – were frequently mentioned as another
proof of manipulations of the presidential elections. Indeed,  the ODM
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won 99 seats, while the PNU got only 43. However, the ODM command-
ed not even the majority of the 207 parliamentary seats declared after the
election. And if taking into account that the PNU was not only a party,
but also an alliance of altogether 7 members and 19 associated parties, its
parliamentary strength goes up to at least 79 seats.2 ‘Split voting’ was
common, especially for the PNU which won a majority of votes in the
presidential poll in 47 constituencies where the parliamentary seat went
to a different party. 
The ‘real’ outcome of Kenya’s December 2007 elections is unlikely to be ever
known, not only because of the difficulties any attempt at re-counting the
votes would face, but also because both sides to the ‘deal’ concluded at the
end of February 2008 appear to have lost interest in it. The commission of in-
quiry into the elections established in March will probably come up with ob-
servations and recommendations about the procedure and organisation of
elections, but is unlikely to make statements about the ‘true’ results of the
2007 elections. 
Still, the observations summarised above allow a few general conclu-
sions about the presidential election result: First, in all likelihood, the result
was very narrow – in o in both directions, and quite consistent with the last
pre-election opinion polls. Second, results were rigged to a considerable ex-
tent – the number of doubtful votes may well have been considerably higher
than a realistically imaginable margin of victory for either candidate;  this
made  the  legitimacy  of  the  election  results  fundamentally  questionable.
Third, it is likely that, while both sides rigged the elections, the government,
using  its  administrative power,  rigged more  successfully and on  a  larger
scale.  Finally,  and most  important,  the  election  showed  Kenya’s  political
landscape to be deeply divided along ethno-political and social lines into two
different camps of almost equal strength, setting the stage for the major erup-
tion of violence that followed.
The dynamics of violence
The post-election violence in Kenya has frequently been  characterised  as a
(more  or  less  spontaneous)  protest  against  an  election  result  widely  per-
ceived to have been rigged. In reality, the picture was far more complex. The
violence took different shapes in different political arenas and different parts
of the country, developing its own dynamics. Three major areas of election-
related violence can be distinguished: political and social protest accompa-
nied by violent attacks, clamped down upon heavily by the government’s se-
curity forces; a campaign of ethnic cleansing especially in the Rift Valley, re-
sulting in numerous killings and mass displacement; and, finally, the emer-
2 These figures include the 207 mandates officially declared after the December elections;
for various reasons,  no results  were  announced for three  of Kenya’s  210 constituencies.
Later on, further 12 parliamentary seats were filled by candidates who were nominated by
the parties according to their relative strength in parliament.
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gence of a more generalised form of ethnic warfare, characterisedby existing
and revived militias and revenge attacks.
Immediately  after  the  announcement  of  the  election  results  (and  in
some  places  already  on  29th December),  protests  erupted  in  Nairobi,  in
Kisumu and other places in Western Kenya, and – to a lesser extent – in the
Mombasa area. The protests were frequently accompanied by opportunistic
attacks on the Kikuyu and members of other groups suspected to have voted
for Kibaki, as well as by looting and arson. It was especially bad in Kisumu
where  the  central  business  district  experienced  severe  destruction;  The
Kikuyu and Indian businesspeople fled the city in large numbers. The regu-
lar police force was largely unable (and, in some cases, also obviously unwill-
ing, for reasons of ethnic loyalty) to contain the violence. The government
brought the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU) into the hotspots: Dur-
ing the first few days of rioting, , in an intimidating show of state power that
clearly constituted excessive force, many dozens – perhaps as many as 100 –
people were shot dead in Kisumu, the ‘capital’ of Odinga’s ethnic heartland..
Similar battles, with dozens of people killed, took place in the Nairobi slums,
where youths fought the security agencies in front of the cameras of the in-
ternational  media.  Outside  of these hotspots,  police and GSU action was
more civil – for example, by using tear gas, rather than live bullets, in central
Nairobi to keep people away from the highly symbolic Uhuru Park, as public
protest gatherings had been prohibited. The space for peaceful civic protest,
as frequently called for by the ODM, was virtually crushed between the vio-
lence of the marginalised youth and that of the state.
A second, very different scenario of violence emerged in the central and
southern parts of Rift Valley Province, especially in and around Eldoret. Im-
mediately after  the announcement of the election results,  bands of armed
young  Kalenjin  men  attacked  the  Kikuyu  and  members  of  other  ethnic
groups who had settled in this region since the 1960s. These attacks were co-
ordinated; some areas were cut off by roadblocks in order to keep security
forces out for several days. The involvement of local elders and politicians,
including the local ODM structures, in organizing and providing finance for
these attacks has been documented for some places. For the time being it re-
mains unclear to what extent higher ODM structureswere also responsible;
many Kenyans assume that William Ruto, the new big man of Kalenjin poli-
tics and a member of the ODM’s ‘Pentagon’, could at least have stopped the
attacks at an earlier stage. The arson of a church in Eldoret on New Year’s
Day, with at least 35 refugees inside being burnt alive, constituted perhaps
the most gruesome example of violence in Kenya’s post-election crisis. At-
tacks on ‘settlers’  in the Rift  Valley probably left  several hundred people
dead; the fear they generated accounted for the vast majority of the ca. 200-
300,000 people who were internally displaced during the first two weeks of
the crisis. The classification of these events as ‘ethnic cleansing’ is surely ap-
propriate;  the  attackers aimed at  driving ‘non-indigenous’  Kenyans away
from land regarded as (historically) belonging to the Kalenjin. The security
forces were much less present in the Rift Valley than in the cities, due to over-
stretch in the vast areas affected as well as to the fact that the government de-
ployed Kenyan army soldiers only in rather exceptional circumstances, most-
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ly for humanitarian operations and for the removal of blockages on major
roads. Events in the Rift Valley bore clear similarity to the election-related vi-
olence in the same areas during the 1990s. Based on long-standing grievances
about land, they had little or nothing to do with the ‘protest against a rigged
election’. 
Thirdly, the rapidly-rising polarisation of the country along ethno-politi-
cal lines generated its own, ‘self-propelled’ forms of violent escalation that
went far beyond any electoral issues. Already during the first days of the cri-
sis, ethnic gangs in Nairobi slums not only began to fight each other, but in
effect ‘cleansed’ entire neighbourhoods by means of threat and assassination:
Thousands of people lost their homes in the process, while others took over
the  abandoned  space.  Soon  afterwards,  ethnic  militias  (re)emerged  in
strength, especially the Mungiki, a Kikuyu ‘sect’ that, in recent years, had
gained notoriety by establishing a quasi-state type of control over slum areas
and operating mafia-like extortion schemes in the transport sector. A week or
two into the post-election crisis, armed groups using the Mungiki name and
style of operation began to ‘defend the Kikuyu’ who, up to this point, had
been largely on the receiving end of the explosion of violence. In all likeli-
hood, these groups were organised and sponsored by politicians. The apex of
this third wave of violence was reached around the end of January, when
Mungiki groups attacked, on a large scale, the Luo and others in the Rift Val-
ley towns Naivasha and Nakuru which had a strong Kikuyu population. In
popular perceptions, these attacks marked the re-establishment of a ‘balance
of terror’ in the ethnic warfare that the Kenyan post-election crisis had de-
generated into. Thereafter, the on-going mediation process helped much to
reduce incidences of violence, even though general insecurity continued es-
pecially in the Rift Valley.
Political polarisationlargely along ethnic lines, combined with escalat-
ing  ethnic  violence  created  a  generalised  climate  of  fear  and  insecurity
throughout all strata of Kenyan society. A number of prominent assassination
victims – among them two ODM MPs – and death threats distributed by text
messages showed that the more wealthy strata of society were not immune
from the risks. The ethnic militias continue to constitute a menace even after
the end of the election-related violence. 
The role of the international community and the mediation
process
Virtually no one among the international actors had foreseen the possibility
of the elections turning into a major violent crisis. But all of them realised the
severity of the situation within a few days and began to address it. The re-
gional impact was obvious enough: Within days, the de facto closure of the
transport corridor from Mombasa via Nairobi and Western Kenya led to sup-
ply shortages in the East African hinterland, especially in Uganda, Rwanda
and South Sudan. Furthermore, the role of Nairobi as a major regional hub
for diplomacy, communications, as well as development and relief operations
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was at stake – as was the role of Kenya as the only supposedly stable country
in the conflict-ridden Horn of Africa region. 
It was not the manipulation of election results that motivated the inter-
national community to take a common stand towards the Kenyan political
leaders. Instead, the very real danger of the country sliding into a civil war
and the possible destabilising and economically disastrous effects on the en-
tire region triggered the international diplomatic engagement. 
While neither the East African Community nor the African Union, as in-
stitutions, took a clear position on the conflict, the chairman of the African
Union, individual (former) heads of state and other prominent Africans came
to Nairobi to offer their help in bringing the opponents together. Diplomats
of the US and the EU consistently and publicly refused to give full recogni-
tion to the election outcome as it stood, thereby provoking formal protests by
Kenya’s foreign minister. They argued that the doubts about the validity of
the results in a very close election and the severity of the violent conflict ne-
cessitated a negotiated political  solution where  power would have  to  be
shared by  the  opponents.  All  relevant  international  actors pushed in  the
same direction – or at least they did nothing that would have obstructed the
negotiation option.
When, on January 22nd, former UN General-Secretary Kofi Annan en-
tered the scene, expectations were running high. He arrived at the point in
time when the violence was about to reach the stage of outright inter-ethnic
militia warfare. While having no direct means to force anything upon the op-
ponents, Annan used his enormous reputation among all sides in Kenya and
beyond with considerable skill and impact, bringing Kibaki and Odinga to-
gether for direct talks for the first time since the elections. He was also well
aware that there would be no quick solution, making it publicly clear from
the beginning  that  he  would not leave  Kenya  until  an  agreement which
would secure peace was reached. It turned out to take more than five weeks. 
Both sides selected small negotiation teams with whom Annan and his
advisors did most  of the  work.  Annan held extensive  consultations with
stakeholders from all sectors of Kenyan society, but restricted the negotiation
process proper to the two party teams. The negotiation teams included hard-
liners from both sides, namely William Ruto (who was by then widely be-
lieved to carry some – unspecified – responsibility for the violence in the Rift
Valley) for the ODM, and the Minister for Justice Martha Karua for the PNU.
In several instances, the process stalled, and direct talks between the two prin-
cipals – Kibaki and Odinga – became necessary. 
After  the  beginning  of  the  Annan  mediation  process,  the  ODM  re-
mained consistently committed to it – unsurprisingly so, given the fact that
the ODM had most to gain from whatever kind of power-sharing arrange-
ment would be agreed upon in the end. The government side proved a much
harder nut to crack. Much pressure had to be put on the government side to
concede some of the power it held. Consistent pressure especially by the US
and the EU (with the UK playing a particularly visible role) supported An-
nan’s mediation decisively. 
Finally, Annan succeeded in brokering a compromise that Kibaki and
Odinga signed on February 28th. The deal involved the creation of the post of
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a prime minister and the sharing of ministries on an equal basis, all this in
the context of a grand coalition government between the PNU/the ODM-K
and the ODM. Thus, Kibaki and Odinga were back at square one of the initial
MoU that both had signed before the 2002 elections.  A number of special
commissions would be created in order to investigate the elections and the
violence and to make recommendations for constitutional amendments. 
The mood swung immediately: Virtually everybody was relieved that
the nightmare of the preceding two months had come to an end, even though
many were aware that the implementation of the power-sharing agreement
would not be easy. Only a few critical observers asked whether a mere pow-
er-sharing deal among the political class had been worth all the killing, de-
struction and displacement. 
Perspectives
The power-sharing deal at the end of February was followed by a period of
enthusiasm that celebrated the re-discovered unity of Kenyans. However, the
difficulties of agreeing on the details of the ministers’ list, positions in the ad-
ministration, state corporations and the embassieshave also shown that no
real spirit of co-operation among the political elite has developed yet. Espe-
cially the PNU have continued to find it difficult to compromise on some of
the positions of power that it held exclusively before. After a temporary col-
lapse of the cabinet negotiations in the first week of April, Kibaki finally an-
nounced the new cabinet on April 13. With 40 ministers and 52 assistant min-
isters it is the largest cabinet in Kenyan history. Power is shared in line with
the Annan agreement, ith the ODM getting 20 ministries, the PNU 17 and the
ODM-Kenya 3. The extremely long and difficult negotiations as well as their
temporary collapse indicate the fragility of the agreement. 
It remains difficult to see how (and for how long) this coalition, formed
under strong external pressure, will operate. Surely, Kenya’s political culture
and the corporate interest of its political class, for all their deficits, provide an
opportunity for the coalition’s survival: Few MPs would want to face the risk
(and expenditure) of the new elections that would follow a break-up. Still,
the crisis since December 2007 has shown that relevant segments of Kenya’s
political class are prepared to pursue power politics, including the use of vio-
lence, in a manner that brought the country to the brink of civil war – and it
is still not clear which kind of lessons they have drawn from this experience.
In principle, the new partnership holds the potential of every grand coalition:
to address Kenya’s long-standing structural problems, i.e. severe social dis-
parities, ethno-regional imbalances, unsolved land issues, and a political cul-
ture that puts a premium on ethnic mobilisation and in which the winner
takes all. It is still too early to predict whether the new coalition government
will be able to move forward on these issues, or whether it will be consumed
by old-style ethnic power politics, the dangers of which have become all to
obvious after December 27th, 2007.
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